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Abstract
This paper incorporates egocentric comparisons into a human capital accu-
mulation model and studies the evolution of positive self image over time. The
paper shows that the process of human capital accumulation together with ego-
centric comparisons imply that positive self image of a cohort is first increasing
and then decreasing over time. Additionally, the paper finds that positive self
image: (1) peaks earlier in activities where skill depreciation is higher, (2) is
smaller in activities where the distribution of income is more dispersed, (3) is
not a stable characteristic of an individual, and (4) is higher for more patient
individuals.
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1 Introduction
Evidence from economics and psychology shows that entrepreneurs, currency
traders, fund managers, car drivers and aviation pilots have one thing in com-
mon: they all hold overly positive views of their relative skill.1 The evidence
also shows that, contrary to the predictions of rational learning models, positive
self image and optimism do not necessarily diminish with experience.2
This paper uses a continuous time human capital accumulation model to
study the evolution of positive self image over time. Individuals start with
heterogeneous stocks of initial skills and have heterogeneous abilities to turn
investments in skills into skills. As in Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005), the paper
assumes that skills have diﬀerent productivity for diﬀerent individuals and that
individuals make egocentric comparisons, that is, when they compare their skills
to the skills of others they measure the productivity of others’ skills using their
own productivity.3
The novelty here, by comparison with Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005), is
that the evolution of the stocks of skills over time (and positive self image) is
determined by an individual’s decision to maximize lifetime disposable income.
This decision depends, among other things, on the rate of skill depreciation,
the ability to produce human capital, and the rate of time preference, variables
whose impact on skill acquisition (and positive self image) were not considered
in Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005).4
The main finding of the paper is that the process of human capital accu-
mulation, skill depreciation, and egocentric comparisons imply that positive self
image of a cohort is first increasing and then decreasing over time. The driving
forces behind this result are: skill investments and egocentric comparisons, skill
depreciation, and a finite working life. Consider the start of an cohort’s working
lifetime before any skill investments are undertaken.5 If individuals’ initial skills,
1Following, Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005), this paper refers to this bias as positive self
image. In the psychology literature, positive self image, falls under the rubric of “biases in
judgment” together with optimism (overestimation of the chances of experiencing favorable
events), overconfidence (overestimation of the precision of forecasts), and the causal attribu-
tion bias (the fact that most people tend to attribute success to eﬀort or ability and failure
to bad luck). For a detailed discussion of these and other judgment biases see Rabin (1998).
2For example, Arabsheibani et al. (2000) find that entrepreneurs’ optimism about financial
outcomes increases until age 36 before starting to decay. The evidence is discussed in detail
in Section 2.
3Results from social psychology justify our modeling approach. The evidence demonstrates
that individuals make egocentric comparisons when evaluating the abilities of others. That
is, in order to evaluate the behavior of others, they apply the standards that they use on
themselves. For a review of the evidence see Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005).
4 Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) show that in the presence of skill enhancement, egocentric
comparisons lead to positive self image. Their approach implies that positive self image in a
cohort should be increasing with experience provided that skill investment opportunities are
increasing with experience. However, Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) do not develop a formal
model that explains the evolution of positive self image over time.
5 In the human capital accumulation model used in this paper we do not model the choice
between time spent in formal education and time working. Thus, when we talk about working
lifetime this includes the formal education period of individuals’ lives.
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ability to produce human capital and productivity of skills are independently
distributed then, on average, there is no positive self image in the population.
The assumption that the productivity of skills is heterogeneous across individu-
als implies that individuals will make diﬀerent skill investments: each individual
will invest more in the skills that he values the most. The assumption that in-
dividuals use their own productivity to measure other’s skills implies that they
will develop, on average, a positive self image. The fact that in the early stages
of working life investments in human capital are large implies that positive self
image will rise rapidly during that time. When individuals approach the latter
stages of their working life new investments in human capital are small and skill
depreciation takes over. This reduces the stock of each skill proportionally to
its current level which in turn reduces positive self image since individuals have
larger stocks of the skills they value the most.6
Additionally, the paper presents four new testable implications of the ego-
centric comparisons and skill acquisition framework. First, positive self image
should peak earlier in activities that use skills with high depreciation rates (e.g.,
information technology jobs) than in activities that use skills with low depreci-
ation rates (e.g., clerical jobs). The intuition for this results is straightforward.
If the rate of skill depreciation is excessively high, then the process of human
capital accumulation during a finite working lifetime implies that the stock of
each skill is increasing during most of an individual’s working life and decreas-
ing as an individual’s working lifetime approaches the end. The higher the skill
depreciation rate, the earlier will the stock of each skill attain it’s peak. Since
positive self image is highest when individuals’ have the largest stocks of skills,
the higher the skill depreciation rate the earlier will positive self image attain
it’s peak.
Second, the model predicts that if there are strong diminishing returns to
the production of skills from increases in ability to produce human capital, then
one should find smaller levels of positive self image in activities where the dis-
tribution of income is more dispersed. The intuition for this result is as follows.
It is a well know result from standard human capital accumulation models that
an increase in heterogeneity in ability to produce human capital increases in-
come dispersion. The result also applies to our model. Additionally, if there are
strong diminishing returns to the production of skills from increases in ability to
produce human capital, then an increase in heterogeneity in ability to produce
human capital, besides increasing income dispersion, also reduces positive self
image. This happens because when individuals’ ability to produce human capi-
tal becomes more variable the chance of moving up in relative rankings through
skill investment decreases.
Third, positive self image should not be a stable characteristic of an indi-
vidual. For the majority of individuals positive self image should first increase
and then decrease over time but for a minority—those who start with high initial
6When there is no skill depreciation the paper shows that positive self image of a cohort is
always increasing over time. Thus, according to this model, a positive rate of skill depreciation
is a necessary condition for obtaining a inverse U-shaped pattern for positive self image over
time.
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skills and who have low ability to produce human capital—positive self image
should decrease over most of their working lifetime.
Fourth and last, more patient individuals should exhibit more positive self
image. When individuals are impatient they discount the future heavily and so
they will devote fewer resources to producing human capital. If that is the case,
then the correlation between productivity and final skills will be smaller and so
will be positive self image.
The paper presents two applications of the model. We show how the model
can make sense on data on trading activity and trading experience in financial
markets. We also show how an extension of the model may explain why poker
players’ perceptions of relative skill become more inflated over time whereas the
perceptions of chess players become more accurate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical
evidence. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 contains the main findings.
Section 5 discusses the main assumptions of the model and additional implica-
tions. Section 6 presents two applications. of the model. Section 7 discusses
alternative explanations for the relation between positive self image and expe-
rience. Section 8 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains the proofs of all
results.
2 Empirical Evidence
The tendency that individuals have to make overly positive evaluations of their
relative abilities is a staple finding in psychology. According to Myers (1996),
a textbook in social psychology: “(...) on nearly any dimension that is both
subjective and socially desirable, most people see themselves as better than
average.”7
Studies on the evolution of individuals’ perceptions of relative ability over
time can be divided into two types: cross-sectional and longitudinal. In a
cross-sectional study a group of individuals with diﬀerent levels of experience
is formed. Each individual within the group is asked to make an evaluation
of relative ability. Finally, the group is divided into sub-groups that share a
similar level of experience with the task and the level of positive self image of
each sub-group is obtained.
In a longitudinal study a group of individuals with the same level of experi-
ence with a task is formed. Each individual within the group is asked to make
an evaluation of relative ability vis-a-vis the group. The process is repeated
7This tendency is also present in individuals’ self-assessments of relative performance in
their jobs. Myers (1996) cites a study according to which: “In Australia, 86 percent of people
rate their job performance as above average, 1 percent as below average.” Baker et al. (1998)
cite a survey of General Electric Company employees according to which: “58 percent of a
sample of white-collar clerical and technical workers rated their own performance as falling
within the top 10 percent of their peers in similar jobs, 81 percent rated themselves as falling
in the top 20 percent. Only about 1 percent rated themselves below the median.” Wichman
and Ball (1983) and O’Hare (1990) find that most general aviation pilots believe that they are
safer, are less likely to take risks in flight, and possess greater flying skills than their peers.
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at diﬀerent points in time, that is, several evaluations of relative ability are
obtained as the group gains more experience with the task.
2.1 Cross-sectional Studies
Road safety institutes in Europe started a consortium to explore car drivers’
attitudes to road safety called SARTRE.8 Among other things, car drivers were
asked to assess their relative driving safety and to report their driving experi-
ence. The results for each country are summarized in Table 1, constructed from
data available in SARTRE 3 (2004a).
Table 1
Mean self-assessments of relative driving safety and driving experience
Country Car drivers 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 >40
Italy 996 3.89 4.15 4.17 4.20 4.38
Ireland 993 4.11 4.11 4.23 4.27 4.35
Portugal 1017 3.92 4.07 4.24 4.39 4.56
Germany 966 3.79 4.11 4.12 4.14 4.37
Hungary 1014 3.73 3.83 3.88 4.14 4.22
Croatia 1035 3.78 3.98 4.14 4.15 4.60
Estonia 1000 3.62 3.88 3.90 3.91 4.21
U.K. 1218 3.93 3.93 4.03 4.14 4.04
Denmark 1057 3.65 3.77 3.90 3.93 4.08
Switzerland 872 3.72 3.93 3.96 4.11 4.28
Austria 979 3.69 3.87 3.92 4.01 4.00
Slovenia 1056 3.68 3.79 3.90 3.90 4.06
Cyprus 754 3.67 3.79 3.92 4.01 4.86
France 966 3.65 3.74 3.79 3.84 3.90
Poland 1015 3.71 3.91 4.00 4.01 4.13
Slovakia 1111 3.56 3.64 4.10 4.05 3.57
Netherlands 1008 3.66 3.72 3.98 3.86 3.83
Spain 1660 3.70 3.78 3.82 3.86 3.82
Greece 1000 3.72 3.73 3.68 3.95 4.00
Czech Rep. 992 3.66 3.64 3.86 4.02 4.13
Belgium 947 3.41 3.53 3.82 3.77 4.12
Sweden 993 3.60 3.68 3.71 3.71 3.68
Finland 997 3.35 3.55 3.59 3.52 3.50
Table 1 exhibits the mean assessments of drivers in each European country
according to driving experience.9 To construct this table drivers were divided
8SARTRE is the abbreviation of Social Attitudes to Road Traﬃc Risk. In 2002 the
SARTRE 3 project was launched and gathered data of car drivers opinions and reported
behavior in 23 European countries. In each participating country, a sample of about 1000 car
driving license holders, representing the active car drivers’ population, have been interviewed
face-to-face using a questionnaire.
9To assess drivers’ perceptions of relative driving safety drivers were asked the following
question: “Compared to other drivers, do you think your driving is...........dangerous?” Drivers
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into five groups according to driving experience: 0 to 10 years, 11 to 20 years,
21 to 30 years, 31 to 40 years, and more than 40 years driving experience.
Table 2 shows us that in 13 out of 23 countries the mean assessments of relative
driving safety are increasing with driving experience. In 7 countries there is
an inverted U-shaped profile: United Kingdom, Austria, Slovakia, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and Finland. For 3 countries—Greece, Czech Republic, and
Belgium—there is a positive relation between mean assessments of relative driving
safety and driving experience but the relation is neither monotonic nor exhibits
an inverted U-shaped profile.10
Brozynski et al. (2004) find evidence of positive self image in German fund
managers.11 They also collect data on each fund manager’s professional expe-
rience. Fund managers were divided into “inexperienced” (less than 5 years of
professional experience), “experienced” (more than 5 and less than 15 years of
professional experience), and “very experienced” (more than 15 years of pro-
fessional experience). The mean assessment of the inexperienced group was
2.33, the mean assessment of the experienced group was 2.72, and the mean
assessment of the very experienced group was 2.89.
Fraser and Greene (2006) find that British entrepreneurs are more optimistic
about their financial outcomes than wage-workers. They also find that optimism
of entrepreneurs diminishes with experience in a sample from the 1990s. How-
ever, in a sample from the 1980s, entrepreneurs’ optimism increased at low
experience levels (from 0 to 5 years) before starting to decay.
2.2 Longitudinal Studies
We are not aware of any study that looks at the longitudinal relation between
positive self image and experience of a group of individuals. However, some
studies are very close to being longitudinal in the sense that they ask two groups,
each with a diﬀerent level of experience with a task, to evaluate relative ability
within the group. Two such studies are Wilson and Fallshore (2001) and Glaser
et al. (2005).
Wilson and Fallshore’s (2001) study aviation pilots’ perceptions of relative
could pick one out of five possible answers to fill the gap in the question: “much more” (coded
as 1) “a bit more” (coded as 2), “about the same,” (coded as 3), “a bit less,” (coded as 4),
and “a lot less,” (coded as 5). Drivers in all countries exhibited a strong tendency to consider
their own driving behavior less dangerous than others’ driving behavior: the average share of
drivers in the 23 European countries who consider themselves to drive less dangerously than
others is equal to 63%. On average, only 5% of drivers in all countries consider to drive more
dangerously than others.
10 It is important to bear in mind that the fact that positive self image of car drivers is in-
creasing with driving experience, does not imply that more experienced drivers over estimate
their driving ability more than less experienced drivers. In the absence of egocentric com-
parisions, the human capital accumulation model implies that, on average, more experienced
drives should be more skilled than less experienced drivers.
11The survey asked: “How do you evaluate your own performance compared to other fund
managers?” The fund managers could pick from 5 categories from “much better” (coded as
5) to “much worse” (coded as 1). The mean assessment for all fund managers was 2.67 which
indicates a tendency to see oneself as better than others.
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flying ability. In this study aviation pilots were asked to report their flight hours
and where also asked to assess their relative ability to avoid inadvertent flight
into cloud or fog (and to fly out of cloud or fog) by comparison with other pilots
with similar flight experience.12 Wilson and Fallshore (2001) find that flight
hours is a significant predictor of pilots’ assessments of their relative ability to
avoid inadvertent flight into cloud or fog and of their relative ability to fly out
of cloud or fog.
Glaser et al. (2005) study the impact of expertise on several judgment bi-
ases. To this purpose they run two experiments. The first one involving a group
of 29 German professional traders at a bank (median age of 33 years, median of
5 years of experience in the bank, 14 had a university diploma) and a control
group of 75 advanced students in Banking and Finance (median age of 24 years).
The second one involving a group of 90 professional investment bankers (median
age of 34 years) and another control group of 76 advanced students (median age
of 24 years). Among other judgment biases, they wanted to compare positive
self image of professionals to that of students. They asked subjects, to state sub-
jective confidence intervals for 20 questions (ten questions concerning general
knowledge and ten questions concerning economics and finance). After that,
each professional was asked to evaluate his own performance and the perfor-
mance of an average professional. Similarly, each student was asked to evaluate
his own performance and the performance of an average student. Glaser et al.
(2005) find that in both experiments the degree of positive self image of pro-
fessional traders is greater than that of the student control group. Thus, the
experience of professionals traders seems to exacerbate the degree of positive
self image rather than reduce it.
2.3 Studies with Objective Baselines
A few studies, besides asking individuals to provide subjective evaluations of
their relative ability, also compare individuals’ self-assessments to objective cri-
teria. The objective criteria can be performance at a task or financial outcomes.
Thus, in these studies it is possible to have an idea of the degree of over esti-
mation of relative ability of each individual by comparison with an objective
baseline.
Arabsheibani et al. (2000) find that British entrepreneurs are more suscepti-
ble to expect better financial outcomes than do employees but experience worse
realizations. Additionally, they find that entrepreneurs’ optimism peaks at age
36 before starting to decay.
12 In this study one question asked (pp. 2): “In comparison with other pilots with similar
flight background and experience as yourself, how would you rate your ability to avoid in-
advertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions (i.e., cloud or fog)?” and another
question asked, “In comparison with other pilots with similar flight background and experience
as yourself, how would you rate your ability to successfully fly out of instrument meteorolog-
ical conditions should inadvertent flight into cloud or fog occur?” The pilots’ answers show
that they believed they were more capable than average at avoiding inadvertently flying into
cloud or fog and being able to successfully fly out of cloud or fog.
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Oberlechner and Osler (2004) use to survey to study positive self image
in North American currency market professionals.13 Almost three quarters of
traders (73.6 percent) perceive themselves as more successful than other cur-
rency traders. Both traders at top tier and lower tier institutions exhibited the
same tendency. A strong tendency for overestimation of relative performance
was also found when foreign exchange traders self assessments were compared
to their superiors’ assessments. The survey participants tended to be fairly ex-
perienced and high-ranking.14 Traders’ work experience in the FX market was
positively correlated with a positive self-assessment.15
Park and Santos-Pinto (2005) find that participants in poker and chess tour-
naments exhibit overly positive views of their relative ability even when given
monetary incentives to make accurate predictions. They also find that overesti-
mation of relative performance of poker players is increasing with an increase in
poker players’ experience with poker tournaments. By contrast, they find that
chess players’ forecasts of relative performance in tournaments become more
accurate with experience.
3 The Model
Consider the following continuous time human capital accumulation problem, a
version of a model that was first analyzed by Ben-Porath (1967):
max
Z T
0
[λ1K1(t) + λ2K2(t)− I1(t)− I2(t)] e−ρtdt
s.t. K˙i(t) = Aα/2 [Ii(t)]
b − δKi(t), i = 1, 2
Ki(0) > 0, i = 1, 2 (1)
where Ki represents units of skill i, λi represents the marginal productivity of
skill i, and Ii(t) represents the amount spent to increase skill i.16
13Among other things the survey asked: “How successful do you see yourself as an FX
trader?” The top rank of 7 was assigned to “Much more successful than other FX traders;”
the bottom rank of 1 was assigned to “Much less successful than other FX traders.” Ober-
lechner and Osler (2004) also asked participants’ immediate superiors (i.e. head traders or
chief dealers) to rank them on a seven-point scale for three separate measures of performance:
“trading potential,” “trading profits,” and “overall contribution to the organization.” The
currency markets professionals gave themselves a mean ranking of 5.06 or “better than aver-
age.”
14The average work experience in the foreign exchange market was 12 years and 75 percent
of the participants were senior traders.
15Oberlechner and Osler (2004) also found that the diﬀerence between a participant’s self
rating and a composite measure of the superiors’ three ratings was positively correlated with
rank, that is, individuals who overestimate their relative performance more by comparison
with their superiors’ assessments have a tendency to have a higher rank in the institution.
16The human capital accumulation model introduced by Ben-Porath (1967) has proved
one of the most succesfull models in explaining the evolution of individuals’ earnings over
the lifecycle. The model has stood empirical testing and provides a plausible theoretical
benchmark to study skill investment decisions over time.
8
According to this model an individual chooses how much to invest in each
of two skills with the objective of maximizing his discounted sum of disposable
income over his life cycle. Disposable income is the diﬀerence between gross
income and the amount spent in goods and services to increase the two skills,
I1(t) + I2(t).
17 Gross income is an increasing function of the stock of each skill
Ki(t) and its productivity λi.18 More precisely, gross income is a linear function
of the two skills weighted by their productivity.
The model assumes that an individual cannot buy skills by going to the
capital market, instead he has to produce them. The rate of change of the stock
of each skill, K˙i(t), is determined by the amount that is produced, Aα/2 [Ii(t)]
b ,
where A > 1, α ∈ (0, 2) , and b ∈ (0, 1) , less the depreciated stock δKi(t),
where δ is the constant rate of depreciation and δ ∈ [0, 1].19 The parameter A
measures the ability of an individual to produce human capital. The assumption
that α ∈ (0, 2) implies that there are decreasing returns to the production of
skills from increases in the ability to produce human capital.20 The parameter b
measures the impact of investments in goods and services on skill production.21
The assumption that b ∈ (0, 1) implies that the production of skills exhibits
decreasing returns to increases in direct expenditures in goods and services.22
The parameter ρ measures the rate of time preference. We assume that
ρ > 0. The larger is ρ the more individuals are impatient in the sense that they
show a stronger preference for present consumption over future consumption.
3.1 Solving the Model
Applying standard control theory to problem (1) one finds that the evolution
of investment in skill i is given by
I˙i(t) =
ρ+ δ
1− b Ii(t)−
Aα/2bλi
1− b [Ii(t)]
b , i = 1, 2. (2)
17We assume that the unit cost of investment in each skill is the same. This assumption is
not critical to the results.
18The literature on human capital accumulation and lifecycle earnings usually assumes that
there is only one skill and that earnings are a linear function of that skill. This assumption
simplifies the algebra substantially.
19Diﬀerent depreciation rates for each skill can be introduced, but this generalization has
no implications in terms of the main results of the model.
20Usually, the production function would be specified with two inputs: current skill stock
and the amount spend in market goods. Assuming that the production of skills also depends
on current skill levels complicates the algebra without changing the main insights in the paper.
In some models of human capital accumulation individuals also have to choose how much time
to devote to market production versus skill production. We abstract from this choice to make
the analysis clearer.
21We could have allowed for α1 6= α2 and b1 6= b2, and also for diﬀerent prices of expendi-
tures in goods and sevices in each skill. This generalization also has no implications in terms
of the main results of the model. We deliberately choose to assume symmmetry in the cost
and production of skills to focus on the implications of heterogeneity in skill productivity in
terms of skill investments.
22 In this model initial stocks of skills are pure rents. Individuals with higher inital skills tend
to have higher lifetime earnings, but they do not make larger investments in skill production.
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Equation (2) is a Bernoulli diﬀerential equation with constant coeﬃcients with
solution given by
Ii(t) =
µ
Aα/2bλi
ρ+ δ
¶ 1
1−b ³
1− e−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´ 1
1−b
, i = 1, 2. (3)
From (3) we see that in this model the amount invested in skills is decreasing
over time reaching zero at t = T. At the beginning of an individual’s working
lifetime there are strong incentives to produce human capital since at that time
human capital generates income for many periods. Similarly, when an individual
approaches the end of his working life there are almost no incentives to produce
new human capital since at that time human capital only generates income for
very few periods. We also see from (3) that investment in skills does not depend
on the stocks of skills.23
Substituting (3) into the equation of the evolution of the stock of skill i
K˙i(t) = A
α/2 [Ii(t)]
b − δKi(t) i = 1, 2,
gives us
K˙i(t) = A
α/2
µ
Aα/2bλi
ρ+ δ
¶ b
1−b ³
1− e−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´ b
1−b − δKi(t) i = 1, 2. (4)
We see from (4) that at the end of an individual’s working lifetime we have that
K˙i(T ) = −δKi(T ), that is, since there is no new production of human capital at
time T, the stock of each skill must be reduced by the amount of depreciation.
From now on it will be assumed that b = 1/2. This assumption makes the
problem easier without making the results in any way less general.24 Thus,
setting b = 1/2 in (4) we obtain
K˙i(t) =
1
2
Aαλi
ρ+ δ
³
1− e−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´
− δKi(t), i = 1, 2. (5)
Equation (5) is a linear nonhomogeneous diﬀerential equation with solution
given by
Ki(t) = Ki(0)e
−δt +Aαλiω (t) (6)
where
ω (t) =
1
2δ(ρ+ δ)
∙
1− e−δt − δe
−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
ρ+ 2δ
³
1− e−(ρ+2δ)t
´¸
. (7)
23This happens because the production function of human capital does not depend on curent
skills levels.
24Equation (4) can be solved for any real number contained in (0, 1). When b/(1− b) is an
integer, the solution to (4) is a finite series. When b/(1−b) is not an integer, the solution to (4)
is an infinite series. For a detailed discussion of this simplifying assumption see Haley (1973)
and Haley (1976).
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Equation (6) describes the evolution of the stock of skill i given the initial stock
of that skill, the rate of human capital depreciation, the ability to produce
human capital, the productivity of the skill, and the rate of time preference.25
From (6) we see that if an individual’s initial stocks of each skill are identical,
then he will have more of the skill that is more valuable to him.
Understanding the behavior of the function ω (t) will be critical for under-
standing the evolution of positive self image over time. Thus, our first result
characterizes the function ω (t).
Lemma 1 The function ω (t) verifies four properties: (i) ω (0) = 0, (ii) ω (T ) >
0, (iii) ω (t) is concave, and (iv) ω (t) attains its maximum at t∗, with t∗ ∈ (0, T ).
Lemma 1 characterizes the behavior of the stocks of skills over time not
taking into account the impact of depreciation of initial skills. This result tells
us that skill depreciation together with a finite working lifetime imply that:
(a) when the stock of each skill is increasing in the beginning of an individual’s
working life then it must decrease as an individual’s working lifetime approaches
the end, (b) when the stock of each skill is decreasing in the beginning of an
individual’s working life then it must decrease faster as an individual’s working
lifetime approaches the end.26
3.2 Skill Comparisons
Assume that initial skills Ki(0), i = 1, 2, ability to produce human capital, A,
and productivity of skills, λ, are independently distributed. Let λ1 = λ and
λ2 = 1 − λ and assume that λ has a symmetric Beta distribution.27 Finally,
assume that A has a distribution with support on
£
A
¯
, A¯
¤
with 1 ≤ A
¯
< A¯ and
that initial skills have a distribution with support on R+.
An individual with initial skills K(0), ability to produce skills A, and pro-
ductivity of skills λ, measures his ability at time t as
W ∗(t;K(0), A,λ) =W (φ(t;K(0), A,λ),λ) = λK1(t) + (1− λ)K2(t), (8)
where φ(t;K(0), A,λ) denotes the optimal stocks of skills at time t as a function
of parameters K(0), A, and λ. Making use of (6) ones has that
W ∗(t;K(0), A,λ) = [λK1(0) + (1− λ)K2(0)] e−δt
+Aα
£
λ2 + (1− λ)2
¤
ω (t) .
25We make no assumptions on the parameters of the model to condition the behavior of the
stock of skill i over time since this is not relevant to our results on positive self image. However,
a natural assumption in a human capital accumulation model with finite time would be that
the parameters of the model are such that the stock of skills are increasing in the beginning
and middle of a individual’s working life and decreasing towards the end of an individual’s
working life.
26The second situation can happen in professions where the ability to produce human capital
is very low and initial talent is almost all that matters. All the findings in the paper also apply
to this case.
27The results in the paper are valid for more general distributions for λ.
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An individual with initial skills K(0), ability to produce skills A, and produc-
tivity of skills λ, measures the expected ability of the population at time t as
E(K0(0),A0,λ0)
©
W (φ(t;K0(0), A0,λ0),λ)
ª
= λK¯1(t) + (1− λ) K¯2(t), (9)
where K¯i(t), i = 1, 2. denote the average skill levels in the population at time
t. Making use of (6) one has that
E(K0(0),A0,λ0)
©
W (φ(t;K0(0), A0,λ0),λ)
ª
=
£
λK¯1(0) + (1− λ)K¯2(0)
¤
e−δt +E(Aα)
1
2
ω(t),
and K¯i(0), i = 1, 2, denote the average initial skills in the population. Following
Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005), let
D∗(t;K(0), A,λ) =W ∗(t;K(0), A,λ)−E(K0(0),A0,λ0)
©
W (φ(t;K0(0), A0,λ0),λ)
ª
(10)
be the diﬀerence between an individual’s ability and the expected ability of the
population, where ability is measured according to that individual’s productiv-
ity. Refer to D∗(t;K(0), A,λ) an individual’s ability gap at time t.
Substituting (8) and (9) into (10) gives us
D∗(t;K(0), A,λ) = λ
£
K1(0)− K¯1(0)
¤
e−δt + (1− λ)
£
K2(0)− K¯2(0)
¤
e−δt
+
½
Aα
£
λ2 + (1− λ2)
¤
−E(Aα)1
2
¾
ω (t) (11)
It follows directly from (i), (ii), and (iii) in Lemma 1 that ω(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, T ] .
This implies that an individual’s ability gap at time t is increasing in A. The
ability gap is always positive for individuals who have high initial skills and who
have high ability to produce human capital. The ability gap can be negative for
individuals who have low ability to produce human capital.
Since initial skills Ki(0), i = 1, 2, ability to produce human capital, A,
and productivity of skills, λ, are independently distributed we have that the
expected ability gap of a cohort at time t is equal to
E(K(0),A,λ)D
∗(t;K(0), A,λ) = 2E (λ− .5)2E(Aα)ω (t) .
The expected ability gap is positive for all t ∈ (0, T ] since E (λ− .5)2 > 0,
E(Aα) > 0, and ω(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, T ] . Thus, the cohort exhibits a positive self
image during the entire working lifetime.
4 Results
The main result of the paper describes the pattern of positive self image over
time implied by the human capital accumulation and egocentric comparisons
model when there is a positive rate of skill depreciation.
12
Proposition 1 If δ ∈ (0, 1] , then the expected ability gap is increasing with t
for 0 < t < t∗ and decreasing with t for t∗ < t < T , where t∗ = argmaxω(t).
Proposition 1 tells us if skills depreciate, then human capital accumulation
and egocentric comparisons imply that a cohort’s positive self image increases
at the beginning of working lifetime, reaches it’s peak at t∗, and then decreases
until the end of working lifetime. Since the intuition for this result was already
discussed in Section 1 let us now discuss the main assumptions behind it.
Clearly, the assumption of heterogeneity in skill productivity together with
the assumption that individuals make egocentric comparisons are the ones that
are responsible for an increase in positive self image in the earlier stages of
working life. Support for these assumptions can be found in Santos-Pinto and
Sobel (2005) and will not be discussed here.
Let us then discuss the role of the assumption of positive skill depreciation.
We can show that if there is no skill depreciation then positive self image,
measured by the expected ability gap, is always increasing over time. To see this
notice that positive self image reaches it’s peak at t∗, where t∗ = argmaxω(t).
From the definition of ω(t) and Lemma 1 we know that t∗ is the solution to
e−δt − δ
ρ+ 2δ
e−(ρ+δ)T−δt − ρ+ δ
ρ+ 2δ
e−(ρ+δ)(T−t) = 0. (12)
Solving (12) for t we have that
t∗ =
ln
£
(ρ+ 2δ)e(ρ+δ)T − δ
¤
− ln (ρ+ δ)
ρ+ 2δ
(13)
If we set δ = 0 in (13) then t∗ = T. Thus, if human capital does not depreciate,
then positive self image of a cohort is always increasing over time.
Taking a linear approximation of t∗ around δ = 0 we have that
t∗ ≈
µ
ρ− δ
ρ
¶
T +
µ
1− e−ρT
ρ2
¶
δ. (14)
By inspection of (14) we can also see that if the rate of time preference is close
to one, then ρ−δρ T is a good approximation to t
∗.28 Thus, if the rate of time
preference is close to one and the rate of skill depreciation is close to zero, then
positive self image of a cohort reaches it’s peak close to the end of working life.29
The approximation also shows that positive self image should peak earlier in
activities where skill depreciation is high (e.g., computer programming, playing
a musical instrument) than in activities where skill depreciation is low (e.g.,
typing, sorting and flipping through files) since ρ−δρ T is decreasing with δ.
28 In fact, when models of human capital accumulation are calibrated to match the empirical
facts on the evolution of the earnings distribution of a cohort over time the rate of time
preference is usually chosen to be larger than .75 and the rate of skill depreciation to be
smaller than .25. See for example Huggett et al. (2002).
29 Simulations of the model with diﬀerent parameter values confirm this. For example,
with T = 60, ρ = .8, and δ = .1, we have that t∗ = 54.105. The approximation gives us
ρ−δ
ρ T =
.7
.8
60 = 52.5.
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Another implication of the model is stated formally in the next proposition.30
Proposition 2 If α ∈ (0, 1), then a mean preserving spread in the distribution
of A reduces the expected ability gap for all t.
Proposition 2 tells us that, everything else constant, an increase in het-
erogeneity in individuals’ ability to produce human capital lowers positive self
image at any point in time. This happens because by making individuals’ abil-
ity to produce human capital more variable the chance of moving up in relative
rankings through skill investment decreases. This result is the equivalent of
Proposition 9 in Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005). The novelty here is the inter-
pretation of the result in the context of a human capital accumulation model.
Before discussing the interpretation of the result let us first discuss the as-
sumption that α ∈ (0, 1) . This assumption tells us that there are strong dimin-
ishing returns to the production of skills from increases in the ability to produce
human capital. It guarantees that the expected ability gap is a concave function
ability to produce human capital and this implies that an increase in variability
in the distribution of A reduces the expected ability gap.31 It is an empirical
matter whether the assumption that α ∈ (0, 1) makes sense or not. At least one
paper in the human capital accumulation literature supports this assumption:
Kurus¸cu (2002).32
Taking the assumption that α ∈ (0, 1) at face value let us now turn to the
interpretation of Proposition 2. Several papers show that diﬀerences in ability
to produce human capital are key for human capital accumulation models to
be able to explain the evolution of earnings over the life-cycle.33 In fact, labor
economists who use human capital accumulation models to explain the evolution
of earnings over the life-cycle agree that the assumption that individuals have
diﬀerent abilities to produce human is the only way to explain the increase in
earnings dispersion over the life-cycle.34
Proposition 2 shows that heterogeneity in ability to produce human capital
constrains the degree of positive self image. More interestingly, this result tells
us that, everything else equal, overestimation of relative ability should be smaller
in activities where the distribution of income is more dispersed. In other words,
controlling for all other variables that have an impact on positive self image
(average income, the number of skills required in diﬀerent activities, experience,
30The comparative static results obtained in Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2004) also apply to
this model and will not discussed here. For example, positive self image is larger the more
variable are productivies of skills in the population, positive self image is larger with one adds
a positive constant to the distribution of A, and positive self image relative to an objective
measure of ability is decreasing with an increase in an individual’s ranking under that objective
measure of ability.
31 If there are weak diminishing returns to the production of skills from increases in the
ability to produce human capital, α ∈ (1, 2) , then the opposite result would follow, that is, a
mean preserving spread in the distribution of A increases the expected ability gap for all t.
32 See Kurus¸cu (2002), pages 22-24 and Table 3 on page 25.
33According to Hugget et al. (2002): “(..) mean earnings and measures of earnings dispersion
and skewness all increase in US data over most of the working life-cycle for a typical cohort
as the cohort ages.”
34For a good discussion on this topic see Neal and Rosen (1999).
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etc.) we should expect to find smaller levels of positive self image if we ask
individuals to evaluate their skills in activities where the distribution of income
is more dispersed. One implication of this result is that if positive self image
leads to poor decision making, then this eﬀect will be small in activities where
income is very dispersed but large in activities were income is not very dispersed.
For example, Cross (1977) finds that 94% of college instructors think their
teaching ability is above average. If college instructors’ income does not become
dispersed over the life-cycle then the model implies that their high level of
positive self image will persist. If college instructors’ positive self image leads
them to make lower investments in teaching skills, then there can be adverse
welfare consequences.35
Another implication of the model is that positive self image should not be a
stable characteristic of an individual, rather it should be a variable one.36 As we
have seen, the model shows us that the process of human capital accumulation
together with egocentric comparisons imply that, on average, a population will
gradually develop positive self image over time. However, this does not imply
that all individuals in the population will display an increasing positive self
image over time. Proposition 1 tells us if the depreciation rate is positive,
then for the majority of individuals in a cohort, positive self image should first
increase and then decrease over time. However, for a minority, positive self
image should decrease over most of working lifetime. This is stated precisely in
the next result.
Proposition 3 If individual λ, A, and K(0) is such that (i) Ki(0) ≥ K¯i(0),
i = 1, 2 and (ii) Aα
£
λ2 + (1− λ2)
¤
− E(Aα)12 < 0, then the ability gap of this
individual is decreasing with t for all t ∈ (0, t∗) , where t∗ = argmaxω(t).
Proposition 3 tells us that individuals who are initially very talented but who
have low ability to produce human capital will exhibit a decreasing positive self
image over time for most of their working lifetime. This result would also be
valid in a model without egocentric comparisons. The individuals who are less
able to increase their human capital and start with high initial skills will become
objectively less skilled by comparison with the population.
We can state one additional result.
Proposition 4 An increase in ρ reduces the expected ability gap for all t.
Recall that ρ measures the rate of time preference. If individuals are im-
patient (ρ is large) they discount the future heavily and so they should devote
fewer resources to producing human capital. If that is the case, then the cor-
relation between productivity and final skills will be smaller and so will be the
degree of positive self image.
35As far as we know there is no empirical evidence as to whether positive self image leads
an individual to put more or less eﬀort into tasks or to make larger or smaller investments in
skills.
36 Interestingly, cross sectionally, positive self image may be a stable characteristic of a
population in an overlapping generations framework, where the young enter the population
pool and the old abandon it.
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5 Discussion and Additional Implications
This section discusses the implications of relaxing the main assumptions of the
model. It also describes additional implications of the model that could distin-
guish it from alternative descriptions of behavior.
5.1 Main Assumptions
To better understand the predictions of the model let us consider the impli-
cations of dropping its two main assumptions—skill acquisition and egocentric
comparisons—one at a time. Suppose first that individuals can not increase their
skills but make egocentric comparisons. Since by assumption initial skills and
productivity of skills are independently distributed then, on average, individu-
als should have an accurate view of their relative ability. It also follows that
each individual’s self image does not change over time either longitudinally or
cross-sectionally.
Now, suppose that individuals do not make egocentric comparisons but they
are able to increase their skills. If this is the case then all individuals should
have an accurate view of his relative ability. Longitudinally, self image will
not change over time. However, cross-sectionally, self image will vary with
experience. If there is no skill depreciation, then self image should be increasing
with experience since, through human capital accumulation, more experienced
individuals will have more skills than less experienced individuals.37
The model in this paper also assumes that skills have diﬀerent productivities
for diﬀerent individuals. It would be absurd to pretend that this assumption
applies to all settings. It does not. In many activities each skill has the same
productivity for all individuals. Even if that is the case we cannot rule out the
influence of egocentric comparisons and skill investment in determining indi-
viduals’ perceptions of relative skill. In fact, it is possible to incorporate skill
investment and egocentric comparisons into a Bayesian learning model where
each skill has the same productivity across all individuals. For example, one
could assume that the process that generates income as a function of skills is
given by
Y (t) =
P
λjKj(t) + ε(t),
where λj , j = 1, ..., J, represents the productivity of skill j and ε(t) is a random
term. Individuals start with subjective prior beliefs about productivity of skills
and learn about the true productivity over time. In this case individual i’s
perception of the process that generates income would be given by
Y i(t) =
P
λij (t)Kj(t) + ε(t),
where λij(t), j = 1, ..., J, is the expected productivity of skill j from the per-
spective of individual i, a function of past observations of income of individual
37 If there is skill depreciation we know that, cross-sectionaly, positive self image will exhibit
a inverted U-shape.
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i. In this model individuals choose investments in skills to maximize the sum of
their discounted disposable income over the lifecycle. Individuals observe their
own income at each period in time and use that information to update their
beliefs about the productivity of skills. After updating their beliefs about the
productivity of skills individuals use their own beliefs to compare their skills to
the skills of others.38
In a model like this individuals will use skill investments to learn about the
technology, that is, there is learning by experimentation. This complicates the
analysis substantially. The pattern of positive self image over time will depend
critically on the variability of the random term. If the random term has a
large variance, then learning about λ will take time and the impact of skill
investment plus egocentric comparisons will persist. In this case positive self
image will increase with experience over most of an individual’s lifetime. By
contrast, if the random term has a small variance, then learning about λ is fast
and the impact of skill investment plus egocentric comparisons will vanish quite
rapidly. In this case positive self image will decrease with experience over most
of an individual’s lifetime.
Finally, the model assumes that individuals do not use any empirical obser-
vations about the income of their peers to make comparisons. This assumption
is not valid for activities where individuals receive unambiguous information
about the income of their peers.
5.2 Longitudinal Studies
The model predicts that the longitudinal relation between positive self image
and experience depends on the rate of human capital depreciation. If the rate
of human capital depreciation is zero individuals’ skills are always increasing
over time and therefore, longitudinally, positive self image should be increas-
ing with experience. If the human capital depreciation rate is positive, then,
longitudinally, positive self image is first increasing and then decreasing with
experience.39
5.3 Cross-Sectional Studies
The model also generates testable implications regarding the cross-sectional
relation between positive self image and experience. If the human capital de-
preciation rate is zero individuals’ skills are always increasing over time and
therefore, cross-sectionally, positive self image should be increasing with experi-
ence. In this case, there are two forces that lead more experienced individuals to
have a more positive view of their relative skill by comparison with less experi-
enced individuals. As time passes more experienced individuals have relatively
38We assume that individuals only observe their own income and have no information about
the income of their peers. If individuals had full information about the income of their peers,
then they could use that information and comparisons would no longer be egocentric.
39This result is valid no matter if individuals’ skills are first increasing and then decreasing
with experience or if they are always decreasing with experience.
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more of the skills they value the most but they also have more of all skills by
comparison with less experienced individuals. If the human capital depreciation
rate is positive and individuals’ skills are first increasing and then decreasing
over time, then a cross-sectional analysis of positive self image over time should
exhibit an inverted U-shaped profile.40
5.4 Studies with Objective Baselines
If one assumes that there exists an objective technology, the model in this paper
can shed some light on the relation between self image relative to an objective
baseline and experience with a task. Here, as before, we need to distinguish
between longitudinal and cross-sectional predictions.
The implications of the model regarding the longitudinal relation between
self image relative to an objective benchmark and experience are straightfor-
ward. We already know that if the rate of human capital depreciation is positive,
then, longitudinally, positive self image is first increasing and then decreasing
with experience. Since, objectively only 50% of individuals can be above the
median at any point in time, then, longitudinally, if the rate of human capital
depreciation is positive then self image relative to an objective baseline should
be first increasing and then decreasing over time.41
The implications of the model regarding the cross-sectional relation between
self image relative to an objective benchmark and experience are more complex.
To see this consider only the case where the rate of human capital depreciation
is zero. In this case we already know that, cross-sectionally, more experienced
individuals should exhibit more positive self image than less experienced indi-
viduals. We also know that if individuals’ skills are increasing with experience,
then, on average, more experienced individuals’ objective relative performance
should be greater than that of less experienced individuals. Now, who over
estimates relative ability more by comparison with the objective baseline: the
inexperienced or the experienced individuals? The model tells us that the an-
swer will depend on the slopes of the positive self image-experience curve and
of the objective baseline-experience curve.42 If slope of the positive self image-
40 If the human capital depreciation rate is positive and individuals’ skills are decreasing over
time, then more experienced individuals will have relatively more of the skills that they value
the most but they also have less of all skills by comparison with less experienced individuals.
In this case a cross-sectional analysis of positive self image over time can generate three
diﬀerent profiles. If the egocentric comparisons plus skill investment eﬀect dominates, then a
cross-sectional analysis of positive self image over time should exhibit an inverted U-shaped
profile. If the skill depreciation eﬀect dominates, then, cross-sectionally, positive self image
should be decreasing with experience. If the two eﬀects balance out then, cross-sectionally,
experience and positive self image should be uncorrelated.
41 If the rate of human capital depreciation is zero then, longitudinally, positive self image
should be increasing with experience.
42The slope of the objective baseline-experience curve measures how much ability is corre-
lated with experience. If the slope is positive and small that means that abillity is weakly
correlated with experience. This may be the case in professions where innate skills matter a
lot and where there are very few opportunities to increase skills. If the slope is positive and
large that means that abillity is strongly correlated with experience.
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experience curve is greater than the slope of the objective baseline-experience
curve then, on average, more experienced individuals are more likely to over
estimate their relative ability by comparison with an objective baseline than
less experienced individuals. If the slope of the positive self image-experience
curve is smaller than the slope of the objective baseline-experience curve then
the reverse happens. Finally, if the slope of the two curves is the same, then
more and less experienced individuals are, on average, equally likely to over
estimate their relative ability by comparison with an objective baseline.
6 Applications
Positive self image may influence behavior in many economically relevant situ-
ations. For example, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find that there is more entry
when relative skill determines payoﬀs, which suggests that individuals overesti-
mated their ability to do well relative to others.
We will now show how the model can be used to make sense of data on
trading activity and trading experience in financial markets. We will also show
how incorporating egocentric comparisons and skill investment into a rational
learning model with subjective prior beliefs about the productivity of skills can
explain the patterns of positive self image of poker and chess players.
6.1 Trading Experience and Trading Activity
In the context of financial markets, positive self-image and overconfidence are
two of the most prominent explanations for why some individuals trade more
frequently more than others. In fact, theoretical models of financial markets
predict that positive self image and overconfidence lead to increased trading
activity.43
We will now show how the model in this paper can be shed light on the
question of gender and trading activity, which has been the focus of a number
of studies starting with Barber and Odean (2001). The argument in this paper is
the following. Theoretical models in finance predict that overconfident investors
trade more than rational investors.44 So, if men are more overconfident than
women, then men should trade more than women. Barber and Odean (2001)
analyze the common stock investments of men and women from 1991 to 1997
using account data for over 35,000 households from a large discount brokerage
and find that men trade 45 % more than women.
The human capital accumulation plus egocentric comparisons model oﬀers
an alternative explanation for why men trade more than women in Barber and
43Deaves et al. (2003) confirm this prediction using an asset market experiment. Glaser
and Weber (2003) also find that investors who think they are better than average in terms of
investment skills or past performance trade more.
44Here, according to Barber and Odean (2001) overconfident investors means investors who
overestimate the precision of their information.
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Odean’s (2001) data. Suppose that men and women are equally likely to overes-
timate their relative trading skill, that trading experience increases overestima-
tion of relative skill, and that overestimation of trading skill leads to increased
trading activity. If that is the case, then if men have more trading experience
than women, then men should trade more than women. In fact, according to
Barber and Odean’s (2001, pp. 269): “The diﬀerences in self-reported experi-
ence by gender are quite large. In general, women report having less investment
experience than men.” More recently, Deaves et al. (2003) have produced ex-
perimental evidence that overconfidence leads to increased trading activity, but
that positive self image may play a role as well.45 Additionally, they find that
individuals with more trading experience tend to trade more 46
Barber and Odean (2002) find that the switch from phone-based trading to
online trading activity is associated with greater trading activity.47 They argue
that investors who switch to online trading are likely to be more overconfident
after going online than before. This happens because these investors usually ex-
perience unusually strong performance prior to the switch and low performance
after. According to Barber and Odean (2002), the strong performance prior to
the leads to overconfidence via the self-serving attribution bias.
The human capital accumulation plus egocentric comparisons model oﬀers
an alternative explanation for this finding. Suppose that trading experience
increases overestimation of trading skill and that overestimation of trading skill
leads to increases in trading activity. If this is the case, then if online investors
have more trading experience than other investors, then online investors should
trade more. In fact, in Barber and Odean’s (2002) data, online investors report
having more trading experience than other investors.
6.2 Poker Players and Chess Players
Park and Santos-Pinto (2005) find that overestimation of relative performance
of poker players is increasing with experience whereas chess players’ forecasts
of relative performance become more accurate with experience. If poker is an
activity where random factors are very important in determining outcomes,
poker players can improve diﬀerent skills, and make egocentric comparisons,
then it may take a long time until experience with poker tournaments reduces
poker players’ positive self image. By contrast, if chess is an activity where
random factors are not so important in determining outcomes, chess players can
improve diﬀerent skills, and make egocentric comparisons, then maybe playing
a few chess tournaments is enough to reduce chess players’ positive views about
their relative skill.
45This is in contrast to Glaser and Weber (2003) who find that positive self image is a useful
determinant of trading activity whereas overconfidence is not.
46 In Deaves et al.’s (2003) experiment women have about the same level of both over-
confidence and trading activity as do men. Thus, contrary to the findings of Barber and
Odean (2001), there is little evidence that overconfidence and trading activity are in any
meaninful way related to gender.
47There was a dramatic erosion in the performance of online investors after they switch to
online trading.
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7 Alternative Explanations
There are alternative explanations for positive self image that can account for
some of the empirical results discussed in this paper. These alternative expla-
nations do not require that individuals are able to increase their skills. They
also do not rely on individuals making egocentric comparisons.
Consider a situation where individuals diﬀer in their ability at a task. To
make things simple suppose that individuals can either be of high or low ability
and where there is a selection eﬀect that rewards high ability: for example, the
high ability individuals survive with probability 75% and the low ability individ-
uals only survive with probability 25%. Furthermore, suppose that every time
an individual is wiped out he is replaced by an (inexperienced) individual (who
may be of high or low ability with 50% probability each). In this case, the more
experienced individuals have, on average, higher ability than the less experienced
individuals. Thus, cross-sectionally self image is increasing with experience. It
is easy to see that, without any added feature, this description of behavior im-
plies that there is no positive self image in the population. One simple way
to generate positive self image is to assume that the individuals who survive
are comparing themselves against the wrong pool.48 For example, experienced
individuals may over estimate the percentage of inexperienced individuals in
the population. If that is the case and assuming that inexperienced individuals
compare themselves against the correct pool, then, on average, individuals will
have a positive self image of their relative ability and, cross-sectionally, positive
self image will increase with experience.49 ,50
Another alternative explanation is that positive self image causes experience.
This happens if positive self image leads to better relative performance and
better relative performance (through a selection eﬀect) leads to more experience.
For example, positive self-image may lead to better relative performance if it
reduces stress.51 Positive self-image may also lead to better relative performance
it has strategic eﬀects on others’ that are beneficial to the self.52 Alternatively,
a person with a positive self image may look more aggressive to competitors
48This possibility was suggested by Joel Sobel.
49 If individual who survive have an accurate assessment of the composition of the population
and the inexperienced individuals underestimate the percentage of experienced individuals in
the population then, there would still be positive self image in the population but, cross-
sectionally, positive self image would be decreasing with experience.
50 If there are strong selection eﬀects towards the survival of the best mutual fund managers
or foreign exchange traders, then this explanation can account for the cross-sectional pattern
of positive self image displayed by these individuals. However, this is not a convincing ex-
planation for the cross-sectional pattern of positive self image displayed by car drivers. Our
own personal experience tells us that the selection eﬀect in driving is either absent or very
weak. A very bad driver is much more likely to get into a serious accident and either die or
become permanentely injured and unable to drive. However, this is a low probability event
and therefore it only aﬀects few bad drivers.
51 It has been documented that most decision makers have a tendency to make worse deci-
sions under stressful conditions. This possibility is modeled in Compte and Postlewaite (2001).
52For example, a person with a positive self image may cause a more favorable impression
on his superiors and so may be promoted more quickly.
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and this may give that person a strategic hedge.53 Each of the variations of this
second explanation may account for the cross-sectional pattern of positive self
image displayed by mutual fund and foreign exchange traders. However, they
can not explain the cross-sectional pattern of positive self image of car drivers’
since both the selection and the strategic eﬀects are absent.54
Finally, experience may cause positive self image through the self-serving bias
in causal attributions: attributing good outcomes to ability and bad outcomes
to luck.55 Suppose that, before engaging in a job, individuals have incomplete
information about their ability but they know that can be of either high or
low ability. Individuals learn about their ability over time by observing a series
of experiments that are correlated with ability. If this is the case then, on
average, inexperienced individuals will develop a positive self image of their
abilities. However, as experience with the task accumulates and provided that
individuals are not too biased, they will eventually learn their true ability. In
other words, when the self serving bias is not too large the model predicts
that, both longitudinally as well as cross-sectionally, positive self image is first
increasing and then decreasing with experience. Of course, if the self serving
bias is very large then positive self image is always increasing with experience.56
8 Conclusion
Rational learning predicts that individuals’ beliefs should become more accurate
with experience. Much of the empirical evidence on the evolution of positive
self image over time reviewed in this paper is at odds with rational learning.
This paper shows that the process of human capital accumulation in the
presence of skill depreciation and egocentric comparisons imply that individuals’
perceptions of skill do not have to become more accurate over time, on the
contrary, they may become increasingly inflated.
We view this explanation as an additional contribution to the literature that
studies the evolution of individual perceptions of skill. The results were obtained
making strong assumptions. By dropping some of the assumptions the results
no longer hold.
An explanation of the evolution positive self image over time across diﬀerent
tasks is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. Still,
the paper shows that some of the ingredients that should be part of such an
analysis are: (1) the possibility of self-selection into an activity, (2) the pres-
ence or absence of skill investment opportunities, (3) the possibility of making
egocentric comparisons, and (4) the frequency and quality of information about
an individual’s performance at the activity.
53This approach is modeled in Heifetz and Spiegel (2001).
54This explanation is also not able to account for the longitudinal pattern of positive self
image displayed by airplane pilots.
55This explanation was first modeled by Gervais and Odean (2001).
56Note that since this explanation does not require any selection eﬀect, it can also account
for the cross-sectional relation between positive self image and driving experience observed in
European car drivers.
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9 Appendix
Derivation of Equation (2) The Hamiltonian for the human capital accu-
mulation problem is given by
H = [λ1K1(t) + λ2K2(t)− I1(t)− I2(t)] e−ρt
+µ1(t)
h
Aα/2 (I1(t))
b − δK1(t)
i
+ µ2(t)
h
Aα/2 (I2(t))
b − δK2(t)
i
.
The optimality conditions for the control variables are given by
∂H
∂Ii(t)
= −e−ρt + µi(t)Aα/2b (Ii(t))
b−1
= 0, i = 1, 2, (15)
and, for the state variables, by
∂H
∂Ki(t)
= λie
−ρt − µi(t)δ = −
∂µi(t)
∂t
, i = 1, 2. (16)
Solving (15) for µi(t) and taking logs gives us
lnµi(t) = − lnAα/2b+ (1− b) ln Ii(t)− ρt.
Taking the derivative with respect to t we have
∂ lnµi(t)
∂t
= (1− b)∂ ln Ii(t)
∂t
− ρ,
or
−∂µi(t)
∂t
1
µi(t)
= −(1− b)∂Ii(t)
∂t
1
Ii(t)
+ ρ.
Making use of (15) and (16) we have thath
λiµi(t)A
α/2b (Ii(t))
b−1 − µi(t)δ
i 1
µi(t)
= −(1− b)∂Ii(t)
∂t
1
Ii(t)
+ ρ,
which after simplification gives us
∂Ii(t)
∂t
=
ρ+ δ
1− b Ii(t)−
λiAα/2b
1− b (Ii(t))
b , i = 1, 2.
which is equation (2). Q.E.D.
Derivation of Equation (3) Equation (2) is a Bernoulli diﬀerential equation
with constant coeﬃcients and can be solved by performing a change of variable.
If we let Wi(t) = (Ii(t))
1−b we have that
∂Ii(t)
∂t
1
(Ii(t))b
=
1
1− b
∂Wi(t)
∂t
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After the change of variable, equation (3) becomes
∂Wi(t)
∂t
− (ρ+ δ)Wi(t) = −λiAα/2b, (17)
which is a first-order nonhomogeneous linear diﬀerential equation. The solution
to (17) is given by
Wi(t) = Cie
(ρ+δ)t +
λiAα/2b
ρ+ δ
, (18)
where Ci is a constant. At the end of individual’s working life investment in
human capital must be zero so
0 = Cie
(ρ+δ)T +
λiAα/2b
ρ+ δ
.
Solving for Ci we have that
Ci = −
λiAα/2b
ρ+ δ
e−(ρ+δ)T . (19)
Substituting (19) into (18) we have that
Wi(t) =
λiAα/2b
ρ+ δ
³
1− e(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´
,
or
Ii(t) =
µ
λiAα/2b
ρ+ δ
¶ 1
1−b ³
1− e(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´ 1
1−b
,
which is equation (3). Q.E.D.
Derivation of Equation (6) Rearranging (5) we have that
∂Ki(t)
∂t
+ δKi(t) =
1
2
Aαλi
ρ+ δ
³
1− e−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´
, i = 1, 2.
The solution to this diﬀerential equation is given by
Ki(t) = e
−δt
∙
C +
1
2
Aαλi
ρ+ δ
Z ³
1− e−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
´
eδtdt
¸
= Cie
−δt +
1
2
Aαλi
(ρ+ δ)δ
− 1
2
Aαλi
(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ 2δ)
e
−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
, (20)
where Ci is a constant. At the start of an individual’s working life the stock of
skill i is given by Ki(0) so
Ki(0) = Ci +
1
2
Aαλi
(ρ+ δ)δ
− 1
2
Aαλi
(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ 2δ)
e
−(ρ+δ)T
.
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Solving for Ci we have that
Ci = Ki(0)−
1
2
Aαλi
(ρ+ δ)δ
+
1
2
Aαλi
(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ 2δ)
e
−(ρ+δ)T
(21)
Substituting (21) into (20) we have that
Ki(t) = Ki(0)e
−δt +
Aαλi
2(ρ+ δ)δ
∙
1− e−δt − δe
−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
ρ+ 2δ
³
1− e−(ρ+2δ)t
´¸
,
which is equation (6). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1 Setting t = 0 in (7) we have that ω (0) = 0. Setting t = T
in (7) we have that
sign ω (T ) = sign
µ
1− e−δT − δ
ρ+ 2δ
(1− e−(ρ+2δ)T )
¶
. (22)
From (22) we see that the sign of ω (T ) is positive if
δ
ρ+ 2δ
<
1− e−δT
1− e−(ρ+2δ)T . (23)
Let us now show that inequality (23) is valid. Let ρ = kδ with k > 0. Sub-
stituting ρ = kδ into (23) we have 1k+2 <
1−e−δT
1−e−(k+2)δT .Now, let y = δT. We
have that 1−e
−y
1−e−(k+2)y is increasing with y and that limy→0
1−e−y
1−e−(k+2)y =
1
k+2 and
limy→∞
1−e−y
1−e−(k+2)y = 1. This implies inequality (23) is valid and so ω (T ) > 0.
Taking the first derivative of ω (t) we obtain
dω
dt
=
1
2(ρ+ δ)
∙
e−δt − δ
ρ+ 2δ
e−(ρ+δ)T−δt − ρ+ δ
ρ+ 2δ
e−(ρ+δ)(T−t)
¸
. (24)
The second derivative of ω (t) is given by
d2ω
dt2
=
1
2(ρ+ δ)
∙
−δe−δt − e
−(ρ+δ)T
ρ+ 2δ
h
(ρ+ δ)2e(ρ+δ)t − δ2e−δt
i¸
. (25)
Since δ2e−δt < (ρ+δ)2e(ρ+δ)t the term inside square brackets in (25) is negative
and so d2ω/dt2 < 0. Thus, ω (t) is a concave function. From (24) we have that
sign (dω/dt|t=0) = sign
³
1− e−(ρ+δ)T
´
.
Since e−(ρ+δ)T < 1 we have that dω/dt|t=0 > 0. From (24) we also have that
sign (dω/dt|t=T ) = sign
µ
e−δT − δ
ρ+ 2δ
e−(ρ+2δ)T − ρ+ δ
ρ+ 2δ
¶
= sign
³³
ρ+ 2δ − δe−(ρ+δ)T
´
e−δT − ρ+ δ
´
(26)
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From (26) we see that the sign of dω/dt|t=T is negative if³
ρ+ 2δ − δe−(ρ+δ)T
´
e−δT < ρ+ δ. (27)
We will now show that inequality (27) is valid. Rearranging (27) we have
δ
ρ+ δ
e−δT <
1− e−δT
1− e−(ρ+δ)T .
Since e−δT < 1 we have that δρ+δe
−δT < δρ+δ .But, we know that
δ
ρ+δ <
1−e−δT
1−e−(ρ+δ)T . These two inequalities imply that inequality (27) is valid and so
dω/dt|t=T < 0. The fact that dω/dt|t=0 > 0, dω/dt|t=T < 0, together with the
fact that ω (t) is a concave function imply that ω (t) attains its maximum at t∗,
with t∗ ∈ (0, T ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1 The change in the expected ability gap over time is
completely determined by the change in ω(t) over time. Thus, Lemma 1 implies
that the expected ability gap is increasing with t for 0 < t < t∗ and decreasing
with t for t∗ < t < T, where t∗ = argmaxω(t). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof is a direct application of Proposition 9 in
Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005). If α ∈ (0, 1) then D∗(t;K(0), A,λ) is concave
in A and so a mean preserving spread in the distribution of ability to produce
human capital decreases EAD∗(t;K(0), A,λ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 From (10) see that Ki(0) ≥ K¯i(0) implies that the
first two terms in (10) are nonnegative. We also see that Aα
£
λ2 + (1− λ2)
¤
−
E(Aα) 12 < 0 implies that the third term in (10) is negative. For t ∈ (0, t∗) ,
an increase in t increases the contribution of the third term and reduces the
contribution of the first two terms to the individual’s ability gap. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 The derivative of ω(t) with respect to ρ is equal to
dω(t)
dρ
= − ω(t)
(ρ+ δ)
− e
−(ρ+δ)(T−t) − e−(ρ+δ)T−δt
2(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ 2δ)2
− (T − t) e
−(ρ+δ)(T−t) − Te−(ρ+δ)T−δt
2(ρ+ δ) (ρ+ 2δ)
.
By Lemma 1 ω(t) is nonnegative. The numerator in the second term is nonneg-
ative. The numerator in the third term is also nonnegative since (T − t)/T ≥
e−(ρ+2δ)t for t ∈ [0, T ) . We also have that
dω(t)
dρ
¯¯¯¯
t=T
= − ω(T )
(ρ+ δ)
−
1−
£
1 + (ρ+ 2δ)Te−(ρ+2δ)T
¤
2(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ 2δ)2
(28)
The fact that 1/(1+z) > e−z for z > 0 implies that the numerator in the second
term in (28) is positive. So, dω(t)/dρ ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] . Q.E.D.
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